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The ABCs of PBMs
As Congress continues to consider adding an outpa-
tient prescription drug benefit for Medicare beneficia-
ries in this presidential election year, the number of
administrative and legislative proposals goes on climb-
ing. While the nature and scope of these proposals vary
widely, they all contain a common element, the use of
PBMs—pharmacy benefit managers.
By acting as intermediaries between pharmaceutical
manufacturers and third-party payers (that is, employ-
ers, managed care organizations, labor unions, and
state-funded pharmaceutical assistance programs for the
elderly), PBMs administer prescription drug benefits. A
major policy and, indeed, practical consideration, will
be the degree of latitude provided a PBM in managing
a Medicare outpatient drug benefit.
As new tools to control drug costs have emerged,
PBMs have enjoyed dramatic market success. Along
with the tremendous growth enjoyed by the PBM
industry in the past decade, however, has come in-
creased public policy attention.
The FTC is scrutinizing PBMs for possible antitrust
violations, the FDA is concerned about their drug
switching and information disclosure policies, and the
GAO is examining how PBMs affect access to drug
benefits in the Federal Employees Health Benefit
Plan. To date, however, the degree of actual govern-
ment intervention has been modest. This may change
in the future.1
In addition to providing background information on
the history and structure of PBMs, this Forum session will
focus on the following public policy questions raised by
the potential use of PBMs in a Medicare milieu:
 What challenges would the government face acting
as a purchaser contracting with a PBM?
 What role would PBMs play?
 What tools would PBMs use?
 What implementation obstacles would PBMs have
to overcome?
 How would various stakeholders be affected?
 What impact on quality of care can be expected? On
cost?
 What unintended consequences might result from
the use of PBMs?
 What competitive issues (within the PBM market
and within the broader health care marketplace) will
need to be addressed?
 What additional research on PBMs is needed?
It is interesting to note that several of these and related
issues (for example, questions surrounding the potential
conflicts of interest, given the financial arrangements and
ownership of some PBMs, and consumer protection and
confidentiality of medical data) will remain on the current
health care policy radar screen, regardless of the outcome
of a Medicare outpatient drug benefit. In fact, many of the
cost management issues that would arise under a Medi-
care outpatient prescription drug benefit currently apply
to Medigap plans.
EVOLUTION OF THE PBM INDUSTRY
In existence since the late 1960s, the PBM industry
has its roots in claims administration. As prescription
drug coverage increased in the private sector, insur-
ance companies were faced with the daunting chal-
lenge of managing efficiently and economically a high
volume of relatively small dollar claims. It was in this
arena and in the related information systems field that
PBMs were born. Having mastered the art of data
standardization, PBMs became leaders in the field of
electronic claims processing.
Ushering in a decade of rapid growth for PBMs, the
development of the plastic drug benefit identification
card in the 1970s changed the way many prescriptions














































































Source: PCS Health Systems, June 1999.
EVOLUTION OF PBM BUSINESS
employee armed with an identification card and using
a network pharmacy pays only a small copayment. The
pharmacist receives the balance from the PBM. The
patient is no longer required to file paper claims and the
pharmacist is paid quickly.
In addition to the card system, PBMs created phar-
macy networks and pioneered mail service benefits that
enable patients to receive medication through the mail
at discounted prices. All of these advances have trans-
lated into administrative simplification and reduced
administrative costs.
Another milestone came in 1987, with the introduc-
tion of online, real-time electronic drug claims process-
ing. As information technology advanced, PBMs were
successful in establishing links with pharmacies to
enable two-way communication of not only claims data
but also clinical information. The entire claims adjudi-
cation process became paperless. This advance yielded
an extremely valuable tool for PBMs—a massive
computer database of prescription records.
The 1990s have witnessed a move by PBMs towards
a greater patient health focus. In addition to fulfilling
their traditional claims processing function, PBMs have
evolved into much more complex organizations, offer-
ing a variety of products and services (Figure 1).
THE PBM MARKET
According to the most recent data collected by the
Pharmaceutical Care Management Association
(PCMA), the organization representing “managed care
pharmacy, pharmacy benefits management companies,
and their healthcare partners in pharmaceutical care,”
 PBMs manage about 1.8 billion prescriptions annu-
ally, 70 percent of all prescription orders dispensed
for ambulatory care patients.
 PBMs employ more than 9,000 pharmacists.
 Over two-thirds of prescriptions are covered by
pharmacy benefits.
In a recent article, “Pharmacy Benefit Management
Companies: Dimensions of Performance,” Helene L.
Lipton and colleagues2 noted that, while estimates of the
total number of PBMs vary slightly due to differences in
Figure 1
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the definition of PBMs, the top ten listed in Table 1




Leading Pharmacy Benefit Management
Companies, as of December 31, 1997
(in millions)
PCS Health Systems 56.0
Merck-Medco Managed Care, L.L.C. 51.0
Express Scripts/Value Rx 22.7
Diversified Pharmaceutical Services 21.0
WellPoint Pharmaceutical Services 15.5
Integrated Pharmaceutical Services 14.0
Advance Paradigm 13.0
Medimpact Healthcare Systems 12.0
Caremark, Inc. 10.0
Eckerd Health Services  9.0
Source: Helene L. Lipton, David H. Kreling, Ted Collins,
and Karen C. Hertz, “Pharmacy Benefit Management
Companies: Dimensions of Performance,” Annual Review
of Public Health, 1999, 20:361-401; data from SMG
Marketing Group, Inc. © 1998.
PBM MERGERS AND ALLIANCES
During the 1990s, there was a great deal of jockey-
ing within the PBM market, a highly penetrated market
compared to just a decade ago. In order to remain
competitive, PBMs have, over the years, merged and
formed strategic alliances. Most recently, in 1998 and
1999, four major mergers occurred: Rite-Aid’s purchase
of PCS, Express Scripts’ purchase of Value Rx and
Diversified, and Advance Paradigm’s purchase of
Integrated Prescription Solutions.3
While most of the PBM mergers and business
alliances have not come under scrutiny, there have been
several instances where critics have questioned the
possibility of conflict. In a book published in 1998,
Sheila R. Shulman and Louis Lasagna noted that4
Among other things, questions have arisen about the
ability of PBMs to conduct their business independ-
ently, particularly with respect to the selection of
drugs for formulary inclusion and with respect to
communications between PBMs and their managed
care or corporate clients. . . . All of these new organi-
zational structures (between PBMs and drug compa-
nies, pharmacy chains, and institutional providers)
have generated questions about the roles and interests
of the various parties. . . . Still another set of concerns
relates to the increasing centralization of the drug
selection process. The pharmacy and therapeutics
committees of large PBMs select the drugs for formu-
lary inclusion. In so doing, they are effectively deter-
mining the drugs to be taken by tens of millions of
patients in the U.S. What appears to be the distancing
of the physician from the final drug selection process
raises questions about the impact of PBMs on the
nature and quality of direct patient care.
PBM CONTRACTS: EXPECTATIONS
AND PAYMENT ARRANGEMENTS
As the PBM industry continues to evolve, the
management of prescription drugs has become increas-
ingly sophisticated. Every customer, whether a man-
aged care organization, manufacturer, or employer,
enters into an agreement with a PBM with a variety of
expectations, as illustrated in Figure 2.
Paying the PBM
The different contract arrangements—fee-for-
service, risk sharing, and capitation—each offer advan-
tages and disadvantages (Table 2). Currently, PBMs
generally do not go at risk. Rather, the majority of their
payment comes from fee-for-service arrangements for
claims processing and selected services, such as reports
or disease management programs. In addition, PBMs
are compensated by retaining a fraction of the rebate
they negotiate with the manufacturer.
PBM SERVICES
In addition to offering their core services—claims
processing, record keeping, and reporting programs
—PBMs offer their customers a wide range of services,
including drug utilization review, disease management,
consultative services, and most recently, Internet prescrip-
tion fulfillment. (Issues regarding online pharmacies will
be the focus of a future Forum session.)
PBMs also assist clients with establishing their
benefit structure. Options for plan design include
developing and maintaining a network of pharmacy
providers, providing a mail service component, and
developing and maintaining a drug formulary.
Retail Pharmacy Networks
Beneficiaries can receive their medication through
retail pharmacies, mail service, or a combination of
5 
HMO-Managed Care
Control of product selection
Complex data analysis and
reporting





































Advantages and Disadvantages of PBM Contract Types
Advantages Disadvantages
Fee-for-service  Potential for lower cost because the PBM is
not exposed to insurance risk.
 Employer does not know in advance what the
cost of the pharmaceutical benefit will be.
Risk sharing  Employers have an incentive to help control
costs. To the extent that the employers can
influence employee utilization patterns (that is,
through coinsurance), they can achieve cost
savings.
 PBM has a financial incentive to control the
cost of the benefit.
 Few companies have the data necessary to
accurately price the drug benefit.
 Potential for higher cost due to partial
insurance risk.
Capitated  Employers know the annual price of the
pharmaceutical benefit in advance and can
plan accordingly.
 If the PMPM* rate is set too low, employers
benefit at the PBM’s expense.
 Few companies have the data necessary to
accurately price the drug benefit.
 Potential for higher overall costs due to full
insurance risk.
 If the PMPM rate is set too high, the PBM
benefits at the employer’s expense.
*Per member per month.
Source: Robert J. Rubin, Anne Hawk, and Elisa Cascade, “PBMs: A Purchaser’s Perspective,” in PBMs: Reshaping the
Pharmaceutical Distribution Network, ed. Sheila R. Shulman, Elaine M. Healy, and Louis Lasagna (Binghamton, N.Y.: The
Pharmaceutical Products Press, 1998), 35. 
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both. Retail pharmacy networks can be either open (very
inclusive) or preferred (very restrictive). In an open
network, beneficiaries enjoy greater access, but typically
at a higher cost per prescription. Preferred pharmacy
networks, while restricting access, are able to offer greater
discounts in exchange for increased service volume.
If PBM contracts can be restricted to limited numbers
of pharmacy providers, additional discounted prices
may be obtained from those participating providers, in
return for the potential for increased customer volume.
However, in 31 states there are legislative barriers in
the form of “any-willing-provider” laws that can
constrain PBMs from excluding pharmacies from the
network.5
Independent pharmacies contracting with PBMs have
raised a number of concerns, one of which involves
what the pharmacies consider to be “frighteningly low
payment rates . . . offered on a take it or leave it basis. In
fact, several hundred community pharmacies have gone
out of business in the last three years. A primary cause
of this is continued low reimbursement rates paid by
PBMs.”6 (Under a typical arrangement, a pharmacy
receives the list average wholesale price for a drug,
minus a percentage, usually around 12 to 15 percent. In
addition, the pharmacist receives a dispensing fee,
typically $2.00 to $2.50 per prescription.) Others point
out, however, that while payment rates may have
contributed to the demise of many of the community
pharmacies, other factors, such as the proliferation of
the chain drug stores, were also involved.
Advocates of PBMs point out that one of the major
advantages of PBMs, given the breadth of their data-
bases, is their ability to pick up potentially dangerous
drug interactions. In addition, given the PBMs’ ability
to amass a patient’s drug history in one place, they can
more easily spot inadequate prescribing and refilling of
drugs used to treat chronic conditions.
Mail Service
In addition to retail pharmacy, the use of mail service
has been growing. The 1998 edition of Pharmacy
Benefit Report: Trends and Forecasts, published by
Novartis, reported the following:
 91.3 percent of HMOs surveyed estimated they will
offer mail service by 1999, favoring an externally
contracted service to manage this option.
 Mail service is predicted to constitute nearly 10
percent of total prescriptions and over 22 percent of
total budget dollars by 1999, with the dispensing
ratio of brand to generic remaining fairly constant in
favor of brand.
 PBMs report that mail service is mandatory for
about 16 percent of the retiree benefits they manage.
The 1998 edition of the Novartis Pharmacy Benefit
Report: Facts & Figures concluded that
mail service continued to be a source of savings for
members who share their pharmacy benefit costs
through copays. Usually covering a 90-day supply
(actual days’ supply reported averaged 88 days), mail-
service copays ranged to $45 for brands and $20 for
generics from lows of less than $2 in some staff-model
plans. The mail-service brand copay averaged $13.88.
Compared to the patient who pays an average of $8.65
for a 30-day supply of a brand prescription obtained
through a retail pharmacy, mail service represents a
value.
Mail service pharmacy must be used judiciously in
order to retain its value. Robert J. Rubin and colleagues
have noted, for instance, that
the use of mail service is increasing because of its
potential to be a low-cost and convenient means of
providing maintenance medications for chronic condi-
tions. However, faulty benefit design might decrease
expected savings if employee cost-sharing is set artifi-
cially low or if mail service is used to distribute medi-
cations for acute (i.e., nonchronic) medical conditions.7
Drug Formularies
The formulary—which specifies which drugs will be
covered and therefore paid for—is the centerpiece of
the pharmaceutical benefit. A powerful lever for
transforming the drug purchasing market, formularies
fall into three broad categories: open, or voluntary;
managed, or preferred; and closed, or restricted. Lipton
has offered the following distinctions based on the work
of David H. Kreling8 and K. A. Schulman9:
Open formularies are the least restrictive type of
formulary, listing all drugs and drug products but
typically providing rankings of which products are
preferred relative to one another; full reimbursement
is provided for nonformulary drugs.
Managed formularies are similar to open formular-
ies in their breadth of covered products but use incen-
tives and interventions to encourage the use of “pre-
ferred” products by physicians (e.g., drug withholds,
academic detailing, and prior authorization), pharma-
cists (e.g., higher dispensing fees to pharmacies for
formulary compliance), and patients (e.g., higher
copayments if nonpreferred drug products are used).
Closed formularies are the most restrictive, relying
on a limited list of drugs approved for use or covered
under the health plan; in the past, closed formularies
allowed patients access to nonformulary drugs only after
they paid a financial penalty (e.g., a higher copayment
or the price difference between a formulary product and
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its related nonformulary product); increasingly, closed
formularies are growing more restrictive by requiring
patients to pay for nonformulary drugs in their entirety
(unless an exception is granted via a prior authorization
process.)
How drugs make their way onto a particular formu-
lary is a complex process. Members of a pharmacy and
therapeutics (P&T) committee usually assist in the
decision. Criteria for formulary inclusion include the
safety and efficacy of a drug product. Another criterion,
the cost of the product, has become an increasingly
important consideration.
Many of the new breakthrough drug and biotech-
nology products on the market, while clinically valu-
able, are expensive. The decision to include or exclude
these products from a formulary has the potential to
profoundly affect patient health outcomes. Many critics
are concerned that, while even restrictive formularies
make available nonformulary products, the price is too
high, especially for lower-income patients. The ability
to successfully appeal for coverage of a nonformulary
product is a growing health policy concern, particularly
as the use of open formularies decreases.
Rebates
In an effort to save plan sponsors money, PBMs
negotiate with pharmaceutical manufacturers for rebates
on products selected for the formulary. According to a
May 1997 American Druggist article, “Tug-of-War
over Rebates,” by Robert DiChiara, Patricia Pesanello,
and Ellen Cappelino, rebates flow from the manufac-
turer through the PBM and are split with the benefit
plan of the HMO or employer (Figure 3).
Rebate arrangements have caught the attention of
many, especially in Washington, D.C. Critics argue that
the potential is there for products to be included on the list
of preferred formulary drugs on the basis of the rebate
negotiated rather than the drug’s clinical efficacy. Often,
the terms of individual rebate agreements are confidential
and not made public, even to the plan sponsor.
In his July 13,1999, New York Times article “Track-
ing Just What the Doctor Ordered,” Robert Pear pointed
out that, should Medicare become a PBM customer, 
Congress and the public would probably insist on
knowing the details of any discounts negotiated on
behalf of Medicare patients. The Comptroller General
of the United States would want to audit Medicare’s
drug spending. Medicare officials would be tempted
to regulate the activities of pharmacy benefit manag-
ers to protect Medicare patients and to save taxpayers’
money. And pharmacists would demand an explana-
tion if they were excluded from the list of drugstores
serving Medicare beneficiaries in a particular region.
Figure 3
TOOLS OF THE TRADE
In order to achieve their double-pronged goal of
obtaining cost savings and increasing patient health care
quality, PBMs have developed a broad spectrum of
tools. For example, PBMs rely on utilization control
measures such as prior authorization to minimize net
drug costs for at least a comparable level of quality.
Another crucial group of tools relied upon by PBMs
are those geared toward encouraging formulary compli-
ance by patients, physicians, and pharmacists. A
formulary is only as good as its implementation. Many
of these tools have their origins in the managed care
world and have been adapted specifically to the phar-
maceutical sector.
Patient Cost-Sharing
Copayments are the most common type of cost-
sharing. For example, in response to rising drug costs,
insurers have begun a three-tiered copay arrangement.
Typical of this arrangement are copays in the following
amounts: $5 for generics, $10 for preferred brand-name
drugs, and $20 to $25 for nonpreferred brand-name drugs.
Most recently, health plans such as Highmark Blue
Cross and Blue Shield of Pittsburgh are considering
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calculating copayments as a proportion of drug costs,
perhaps as much as one-third. This approach is essentially
a form of coinsurance. The objective with both copays
and coinsurance is to motivate beneficiaries to use the
most economical drug, whether purchasing prescriptions
in a retail pharmacy or through a mail service.
Based on data from the 1998 Managed Care Phar-
macy Director CUE Program, the Novartis 1998
Pharmacy Benefit Report: Facts and Figures indicated
that “the differential between brand and generic copay-
ments for formulary drugs tightened at $8.65 to $6.02,
respectively. The copayment for nonformulary brands
jumped to an overall average of $12.28, with highs
ranging to $25 in some IPA models.”
Physician Prescribing Practices
Getting to the physician early on is critical for
formulary compliance. In addition to the more tradi-
tional methods, such as communication about preferred
drug products between doctors and PBM pharmacists
and informational materials sent directly to patients, a
recent approach involves the assumption of risk on the
part of physician organizations—a potent incentive for
formulary compliance. Not surprisingly, most physi-
cians are less than enthusiastic about this arrangement,
particularly as drug prices continue to climb and direct-
to-consumer advertizing continues to increase.
Physician connectivity—enabling the physician in
his or her office to prescribe online—is one of the
newest tools making its way into medical practice.
Going from a POS (point of sale) system in the phar-
macy to a POP (point of prescribing) system in the
physician’s office enables the PBM to intervene more
rapidly. A problem message (such as “potential drug
interaction” or “nonformulary drug”) could immediately
flash on the physician’s computer screen, allowing a
physician to change the prescription instantly, thus
eliminating the need for the pharmacist to call. While
this technology exists, it is not yet widespread. It is
thought that within five to ten years this tool will
become commonplace.
Formularies and Pharmacists
To encourage formulary compliance by pharmacists,
several PBMs have instituted financial incentives,
such as “floating” dispensing fees based on formulary
or generic dispensing levels attained within specific
pharmacy networks. Kreling et al. found that pharma-
cists’ willingness to respond to such incentives may
be mitigated by other requirements and incentives
created by PBMs, such as high-volume dispensing and
time-intensive documentation of drug interchanges.10
Drug Interchange Programs
The use of various drug interchange programs by
PBMs, such as generic substitution and therapeutic
substitution, has sparked a good deal of controversy. At
issue is the question of whether these programs compro-
mise patients’ access to necessary therapies, thereby
contributing to negative health outcomes. On the other
hand, proponents are of the opinion that these programs
hold great promise in slowing the growth rate of drug
expenditures by promoting clinically appropriate and
cost-effective products.
PBMs are geared towards keeping costs down for
therapeutically similar drugs. The challenge will be in
figuring out how to moderate spending for new, im-
proved, more expensive products.
THE FORUM SESSION
Should an outpatient prescription drug benefit be
implemented under Medicare and should PBMs become
a cornerstone of that benefit, Medicare will most likely
find itself in a precarious situation. While it will enjoy
its clout as a (very) large purchaser, it will no doubt be
subjected to the vagaries of special interests and the
scrutiny of Congress—challenges private companies do
not have to overcome. Additionally, the administration
of such a benefit and the infrastructure necessary to
transform policy into practice raise numerous questions.
The purpose of this Forum meeting is to shed light
on the structure of PBMs while raising implementation
issues and public policy concerns regarding their role in
a Medicare outpatient prescription drug benefit. It is
not, however, designed to address whether Medicare
should cover outpatient prescription drugs and what that
benefit should be.
Peter D. Fox, Ph.D., president of PDF Incorpo-
rated, is a consultant who specializes in managed care
for both private- and public-sector clients. He has
assisted clients in selecting PBMs and is currently
preparing a report for the American Association of
Retired Persons’ Public Policy Institute on the cost
management issues that could arise if a Medicare
outpatient prescription drug benefit materializes. Fox
will lead off with an overview of PBMs, focusing on
the complex relationships between stakeholders and
PBMs. He will also illustrate the various techniques
utilized by PBMs to decrease drug spending. In addi-
tion, he will address administrative issues related to the
Health Care Financing Administration should a Part D
Medicare drug benefit materialize.
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Terry S. Latanich, senior vice president for govern-
ment affairs with Merck-Medco Managed Care, will
provide the “inside story” of PBMs, focusing his
remarks on the potential role of PBMs in a broad-based
Medicare outpatient prescription drug benefit. Chris
O’Flinn, J.D., LLM, manager of global benefits for
Mobil Corporation, will describe the private-sector
experience with PBMs, both in specific terms regarding
Mobil’s retirees and more generally regarding Mobil’s
part in the three-year-old National Prescription Drug
Coalition, a prescription drug group purchasing entity.
Wrapping up the session will be Phonzie Brown, vice
president of MIM Health Plans. Brown will discuss the
advantages and disadvantages of PBMs in the Medicaid
program (specifically in the TennCare program) and will
share Tennessee’s experiences with outpatient prescrip-
tion drugs, PBMs, and that segment of its population
dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid. This group,
although small, accounts for a significant amount of drug
spending. The lessons learned from the states will be
important as policymakers analyze the potential Medicare
outpatient drug benefit.
GLOSSARY11
Academic detailing: An educational outreach program
in which pharmacists provide one-to-one, objective, and
unbiased consultations to physicians, designed to
promote cost-effective drug prescribing.
Average Wholesale Price (AWP): the published sug-
gested wholesale price of a drug obtained from the drug
manufacturer/labeler or from a price survey of wholesal-
ers; often used by pharmacists to price prescriptions;
drug manufacturers suggest a list price that wholesalers
charge pharmacies; the average of the list prices, col-
lected for many wholesalers, is called a drug's AWP.
Capitation: A method of reimbursement in which pay-
ments are made in advance on a per-member-per-month
(PMPM) basis to a health care provider for providing
specified services during a specified period of time to
enrolled members of a managed care organization.
Carve-out: Agreement between a managed care organi-
zation or other insurer and a separate firm or organiza-
tion that specializes in providing specific plan benefits
(for example, mental health services or pharmacy
benefits) on a stand-alone basis.
Chargeback: An amount of money returned by a pharma-
ceutical manufacturer directly or through a wholesaler to
an HMO after the HMO's purchase of pharmaceuticals. A
chargeback is essentially a "discount" for the purchase of
the pharmaceuticals. It is usually the difference between
the average wholesale price of a drug and the price bid by
the pharmaceutical manufacturer.
Closed formulary: A limited list of drugs approved for
use; nonformulary drugs are not covered by the health
plan and require prior authorization and higher copay-
ments or full payment by patients (see formulary,
managed formulary, and open formulary).
Copayment: A fixed fee paid by the patient each time
he or she uses certain medical services.
Detailing: Provision of information about drug prod-
ucts by sales representatives of the pharmaceutical
industry to physicians to influence the physicians'
prescribing behavior.
Disease management: A philosophy toward the treat-
ment of the patient with an illness (usually chronic in
nature) that seeks to prevent recurrence of symptoms,
maintain high quality of life, and prevent future need for
acute and more costly medical interventions by using an
integrated, comprehensive approach to health care;
pharmaceutical care, continuous quality improvement,
practice guidelines, and case management all play key
roles in this effort, which (in theory) will result in de-
creased health care costs and improved patient outcomes.
Drug claims processing: An automated assessment of
drug claims at the point of service, meant to detect
potential problems that should be addressed before
drugs are dispensed to patients (for example, checking
patients' eligibility for drug coverage or checking
whether the prescription has been filled at another
pharmacy in the last prescription cycle).
Drug risk-sharing arrangements: Health care organi-
zations may be at partial, full, or no risk for drug costs.
Groups at partial risk for drug costs share in a
proportion of savings and/or cost overruns; the
group can share in savings if it prescribes less than
the budgeted amount ("upside risk"), and it may also
share in any over-expenditures (downside risk).
Groups at full risk for drug costs realize all of the
savings or absorb all of the losses.
Groups at no risk for drug costs absorb none of the
losses and profits (typically, risks are absorbed by
the HMO or other managed care organization).
Drug utilization review/evaluation: An authorized,
structured and continuing program that reviews, analyzes,
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and interprets drug-prescribing patterns against predeter-
mined standards (see prospective and retrospective drug
utilization review).
Firewall: FTC requirement that PBMs owned by
pharmaceutical manufacturers must prevent the flow of
certain information between the PBM and its parent
company and vice versa; for example, the parent
company is prevented from obtaining information on
pricing and bid features submitted by competitors to the
PBM.
Formulary: A list of drugs that are approved for use by
a hospital, health plan, or other health care organization
and that will be dispensed through participating phar-
macies to an insured person (see open formulary,
managed formulary, and closed formulary).
Generic drug: A chemically equivalent copy of a brand
name drug with an expired patent; typically less expen-
sive and sold under a chemical name for the drug, not
the brand name.
Generic substitution: Substitution of generically equiv-
alent drugs for their brand-name counterparts as a
cost-saving device.
Global budget: A comprehensive fixed payment for all
health care services for a given period of time within
which a provider of services must operate; with a global
budget attempts are made to align financial incentives
across different provider types (for example, a vertically
integrated organization such as Kaiser may have a
global budget that encompasses primary care and
specialty physician services, pharmacy costs, hospital-
ization, and other health care services).
Hard edit: A preprogrammed block that cannot be
overridden by the patient, the pharmacist, or the physi-
cian without a prior authorization or edit override; often
implemented by HMOs to block the use of a nonformu-
lary drug product.
Mail service: Program offering pharmaceutical agents
through the mail, typically at discounted prices relative
to those of independent or chain pharmacies.
Managed formulary: A list of "preferred" drugs devel-
oped by an HMO or other managed care organization,
typically a subset of its open formulary; incentives are
created at the physician, pharmacist, and patient levels
to encourage use of "preferred" drug products (for
example, lower patient copayment for such products)
(see formulary, open formulary, and closed formulary).
Market share: The percentage of the total population
(nationally, by state, by region, by local market, etc.)
that is participating in a managed care product, such as
a specific HMO.
Maximum Allowable Cost (MAC): A maximum price
that retail pharmacies in 'plans' networks may be paid
for certain generic drugs.
Maximum Allowable Cost (MAC) list: List of prescrip-
tion medications established by a health plan and dis-
tributed to pharmacies for which reimbursement will be
provided at a generic price level only, regardless of
what is dispensed.
"Me too" drug: brand-name drug that falls into the
same therapeutic class as another drug product but
confers no additional therapeutic benefit.
Open formulary: Provides coverage for almost all
drugs; the patient's copayment is not based on a drug's
formulary status (see formulary, managed formulary,
and closed formulary).
Payer: Party, organization, or individual paying for
health care services (for example, patient for out-of-
pocket payments, insurer, HMO, or self-insured em-
ployer for capitated or fee-for-service payments).
Pharmaceutical care: A strategy that attempts to utilize
drug therapy more efficiently to achieve outcomes that
improve a patient's quality of life; a set of relationships
and decisions through which physicians, pharmacists,
nurses, and patients work together to design, imple-
ment, and monitor a treatment plan that will produce
therapeutic outcomes.
Pharmacoeconomics: The description and analysis of
the costs and consequences of drug therapy to health
systems and society.
Pharmacy and Therapeutics (P&T) Committee: A
committee of physicians, pharmacists, and other health
care professionals in a health care organization that
determines drug treatment policies and formulary
issues; the P&T Committee manages the formulary and
acts as the organizational line of communication
between the medical and pharmacy components of the
health care organization.
Pharmacy network: Pharmacies under contract with
HMOs and/or their contractual PBM partners to provide
drug services, typically at a negotiated discounted fee.
PMPM: Per-member-per month; specifically applies to
revenue or cost for each member enrolled in a health
plan each month.
Practice guidelines: Treatment procedures arrived at
and agreed upon by a medical committee or group for
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certain common medical conditions; a guideline pro-
vides the clinician with specific treatment options or
steps when faced with a particular set of clinical symp-
toms, signs, or laboratory data.
Prior authorization: The approval a physician must
obtain from an HMO or other payer before hospitaliz-
ing a patient, performing certain procedures, or using
certain medical products or drugs, for the service to be
covered by the health plan.
Profiling: An analytical tool that uses epidemiologic
methods to compare practice patterns of providers on the
dimensions of cost, service use, and/or quality of care; the
provider's pattern of practice is expressed as a rate,
aggregated over time, for a defined population of patients.
Prospective drug utilization review (P-DUR): De-
signed to enable pharmacists to detect potential prob-
lems with drug therapy before dispensing medications.
Purchaser: Buyer of health care services or insurance;
includes patients who purchase individual private
insurance policies or pay for health care out-of-pocket,
as well as self-funded employers, employer coalitions,
and government organizations as group buyers.
Quality assurance (QA)/management: A peer review
process that audits the quality of care delivered; may be
measured with instruments such as member satisfaction
questionnaires, chart audits, member transfer rates, etc.
Rebate: A sum of money given to an organization
(typically a health plan) by a drug manufacturer in
exchange for inclusion of the manufacturer's drug
product on the formulary or, more recently, in exchange
for moving market share of a particular ("preferred")
drug or combination of drugs ("bundling").
Retrospective drug utilization review (R-DUR): Auto-
mated checks of drug claims data after drugs are dis-
pensed, to identify potentially inappropriate prescriptions
for individual patients; if the computer program finds that
a physician's prescription for a particular patient has
violated the criteria for optimal drug use, the case is
reviewed by a panel of physicians and pharmacists; if the
panel finds the prescription problematic, it sends an
advisory letter asking the physician to change it.
Risk: Acceptance of the possibility of financial gain or
loss for provision of health care benefits at a fixed rate;
potential to lose money, earn money, or spend more
time without additional payment.
Risk pools: Sums of money set aside by a managed care
organization for payment of hospital, emergency room,
physician services, or specialized services such as
drugs; risk pools constitute a portion of a managed care
organization's direct medical expenses or a percentage
of profit, which the managed care organization
contracts to pay the provider if specific performance
goals are met.
Therapeutic interchange: A therapeutically similar
drug of equal efficacy and less expense is interchanged
for a nonpreferred drug; typically this occurs in pharma-
cies through the use of an online hard edit that indicates
lack of coverage of a prescribed drug and offers cov-
ered alternatives; this change can occur only with the
consent of the physician (also referred to as "switch" or
"conversion" programs).
Third-party administrator: An entity, usually an
insurance company, that provides health plan adminis-
tration services, including claims processing, and
assumes no financial risk.
Withhold: An amount (often 10 percent to 20 percent
of the monthly capitation payment), held in reserve by
the managed care organization; at the end of each fiscal
year, the money withheld from the risk pool is used to
satisfy outstanding assessments, and any remainder is
distributed to the providers; withholds can be tied to a
physician’s own practice quality, efficiency and referral
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